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Concerns regarding the scalability of the inter-domain routing have encouraged researchers
to start elaborating a more robust Internet architecture. While consensus on the exact form
of the solution is yet to be found, the need for a semantic decoupling of a node’s location and
identity is generally accepted as a promising way forward. However, this typically requires the
use of caches that store temporal bindings between the two namespaces, to avoid hampering
router packet forwarding speeds. In this article, we propose a methodology for an analytical
analysis of cache performance that relies on the working-set theory. We first identify the
conditions that network traffic must comply with for the theory to be applicable and then
develop a model that predicts average cache miss rates relying on easily measurable traffic
parameters. We validate the result by emulation, using real packet traces collected at the
egress points of a campus and an academic network. To prove its versatility, we extend the
model to consider cache polluting user traffic and observe that simple, low intensity attacks
drastically reduce performance, whereby manufacturers should either overprovision router
memory or implement more complex cache eviction policies.
1 Introduction
The growing consensus within the network commu-
nity today is that a semantic separation of the iden-
tity and location information, currently overloaded in
IP addresses, would solve the limitations of the rout-
ing infrastructure [14, 23]. Such architectural update
involves network infrastructure upgrades in few, se-
lected, network points like border routers, where the
linking of the two namespaces must be performed.
But, more importantly, it also entails the more chal-
lenging implementation of a mapping-system able to
distribute dynamic location-identity bindings (map-
pings) to globally distributed routers.
In this context, routers generally retrieve mappings
on user demand, as opposed to proactively fetching
them. This is done such that the amount of memory
a router requires to participate in the system does not
grow with identifier space, as is the case today, but
is instead dependent on the packet level traffic the
router processes. As a result, to diminish retrieval
times, increase packet forwarding speed and to pro-
tect the mapping system from floods of resolution re-
quests, routers are provisioned with mappings caches
(map-caches) that temporarily store in use bindings.
Although caches placed between processor and
main memory, in operating systems or in web proxies
are well studied [2, 6, 25], route and mappings caches
have yet to be thoroughly analyzed. A considerable
number of experiments have empirically evaluated
map-cache performance, however they are mainly fo-
cused on providing a circumstantial description of
cache behavior, that is, for particular cache config-
urations and network traffic traces, as opposed to a
general one [15, 20, 19, 17, 32]. Typically, these re-
sults yield accurate estimates for cache performance
but unfortunately cannot be extrapolated to provide
rough projections or bounds on cache behavior for
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workloads with different characteristics; nor can they
provide insight into what traffic properties influence
cache performance and to what degree. Answering
such questions would not only be a first important
step towards understanding the overall performance
of the mapping-system, but would also provide a
quick way of gauging the expected map-cache per-
formance of any network domain.
In this paper, we present an analytical model that,
to the best of our knowledge, constitutes the first the-
oretical framework for map-cache performance analy-
sis and provisioning. The model relies on coarse traf-
fic parameters and aims to be applicable to a wide
range of scenarios. In particular, we first show how
the working-set theory [9] may be used to estimate
simple parameters that characterize the intrinsic lo-
cality of network traffic and thereafter explain how
they can be leveraged to link cache size and miss rate.
The underlying assumption that enables the analysis
is that traffic can be approximated as having a sta-
tionary generating process. We find stationarity to
hold for real network traffic, and, to facilitate the use
of the model, we propose a simple methodology that
tests for it in network traces. Finally, we validate
the result by emulation, using packet traces collected
at the edges of a campus and an academic network.
Part of these results have been previously presented
in [8].
Another contribution of this paper is that we ex-
ploit the model to (i) perform an in-depth, over time
analysis of cache performance for our datasets and
(ii) study the security of the map-cache by evaluat-
ing its vulnerability to scanning attacks. Our findings
show that miss rate decreases at an accelerated pace
with cache size and eventually settles to a power-
law decrease. As a result, even for a relative small
size, 10% of the Internet’s aggregated routing ta-
ble, the performance is still acceptable, below 0.2%
packet miss-rate. On the other hand, we also find
that even simple and low intensity attacks may com-
promise performance and that increasing the cache
size does not alleviate the problem while the map-
cache cannot accommodate the whole destination ad-
dress space. Thereby, to achieve acceptable forward-
ing speeds, manufacturers should either overprovision
router memory or design efficient cache management
algorithms.
For the sake of clarity, we focus our analysis on
the performance of LISP map-cache (see Section 2).
Nevertheless, the results are relevant for other ar-
chitectures inspired by the location/identity split
paradigm, including those like ILNP [3] that use DNS
as their mapping system, since the equations could
be used to approximate DNS resolver caching perfor-
mance. Moreover, the cache models could be applied
to route-caching and scalability techniques that fo-
cus on shrinking routing tables to extend router life-
times [4].
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion 2 provides an overview of the location/identity
split paradigm and one of its most successful imple-
mentations, LISP. In Section 3 we first introduce the
cache model problem and then present our analytical
model and its extension that accommodates for cache
pollution attacks. Section 4 describes the methodol-
ogy used and the results that validate the two models.
Section 5 discusses the predictions of our results when
applied to our datasets and some design guidelines to
improve cache performance. Section 6 presents the
related work. Finally, Section 7 concludes the pa-
per.
2 Location/Identity Split
Background
Prompted by the growing BGP routing tables and
associated churn, researchers in both academia and
operational community have spent recent years (ar-
guably the last couple of decades) trying to improve
the scalability of the Internet’s architecture. The fac-
tors supporting the routing table’s growth are partly
organic in nature, as new domains are continuously
added to the topology however, they are also closely
related to current operational practices [23]. In this
sense, multihoming, traffic engineering and alloca-
tions of provider-independent prefixes are the main
drivers behind the prefix de-aggregation that drives
the increase of the routing tables. On the one hand,
this effect is detrimental because it leads to engineer-
ing limitations, as the growth rate of the routing ta-
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ble surpasses that of its supporting technology, but it
is also harmful to network operators’ business since
the added capital expenses result in less cost-effective
networks [23].
It has been long hinted at and today it is gener-
ally accepted that the origin of this architectural in-
flexibility can be tracked down to the semantic over-
loading of the IP addresses with both location and
identity information [26]. Therefore, their separa-
tion, typically referred to as a loc/id split, has been
proposed by many solution that aim to mitigate the
routing problems [21] but also by those aiming to
integrate new features [24]. Apart from infrastruc-
ture upgrades, these architectures also require the
deployment of a mapping-system for linking the two
new namespaces and often rely on caches to limit
router memory requirements and improve forwarding
speeds.
Given that the loc/id split paradigm only outlines a
set of principles, for completeness, in what follows we
use the Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP) [11,
28], to illustrate the operation of a fully-fledged loc/id
architecture. LISP is one of the most successful loc/id
split implementations to date and counts with the
support of a sizable community [1] dedicated to its
development.
Prior to forwarding a host generated packet (see
Fig. 1), a LISP router maps the destination address,
an end-host identifier (EID), to a corresponding des-
tination routing locator (RLOC). This is achieved by
first looking up the destination in the local mappings
cache, the map-cache, and, if this fails, by request-
ing the mapping to a mapping system [31, 17, 22].
So, instead of proactively storing bindings for all the
possible identifiers in the Internet, LISP routers re-
quest and store them in accordance to the packet
level traffic they process. This ensures that map-
cache size is independent of the identity namespace
size and only dependent on local user needs. Once
a mapping is obtained, the border router encapsu-
lates and tunnels [13] the packet from source edge to
corresponding destination edge tunnel router (TR),
where the packet is decapsulated and forwarded to
its intended destination.
Stale map-cache entries are avoided with the help
of timeouts, called time to live (TTL), that mappings
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Figure 1: Example packet exchange between
EIDSRC and EIDDST with LISP. Following intra-
domain routing, packets reach TRA which, not hav-
ing a prior map-cache entry, obtains a mapping bind-
ing EIDDST to RLOCB from the mapping-system
(steps 1-3). TRA stores the mapping in the map-
cache (step 4) and then encapsulates and forwards
the packet to RLOCB over the Internet’s core (step
5). TRB decapsulates the packets and forwards them
to their intended destination.
carry as attributes, while consistency is ensured by
proactive LISP mechanisms which allow the owner of
an updated mapping to inform its peers of the change.
The map-cache is most efficient in situations when
destination EIDs present high temporal locality and
its size depends on the visited destinations set size.
As a result, performance depends entirely on map-
cache provisioned size, traffic characteristics and the
eviction policy set in place. We dedicate the remain-
der of the paper to finding and evaluating the relation
between parameters like cache size, performance and
locality of traffic.
3 Cache Performance
This section presents the theoretical background and
analytical methodology used to model map-cache
performance. After briefly introducing the working-
set theory we formalize the cache modeling problem
and show that the working-set is suitable for the anal-
ysis of our network traces. The results enable us to
3
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Figure 2: The Working-Set Model. At time t,
W (t, T ) is the set of units recently referenced in the
time window T , i.e., during the interval [t−T + 1, t].
derive a cache model and by extension one that ac-
counts for cache polluting attacks.
3.1 Problem Definition
For operating systems, a general resource allocation
treatment was possible after it was observed that pro-
grams often obey the so called principle of locality.
The property arises from the empirical observation
that programs favor only a subset of their informa-
tion at a given time, so they may be efficiently run
only with a fraction of their total data and instruc-
tion code. It was shown that if the subset, called
the program’s locality, can be computed, the policy
of keeping the locality in memory is an optimal or
near optimal memory management policy [29].
Based on previous results [15, 19, 20], we argue that
prefix-level network traffic roughly obeys the same
principle because of, among others, skewed destina-
tion popularity distributions and flow burstiness in
time, as they gives rise to temporal locality, but also
due to aggregation, i.e., multiplexing of a large num-
ber of user flows, which leads to a form of geograph-
ical locality. We therefore evaluate the feasibility of
in-router prefix/mappings caching by analyzing the
locality of network traffic. Since we want to avoid
any assumptions regarding the structure of the pro-
cess generating the network traffic, we opt in our eval-
uation for the working-set model of locality. For a list
of other locality models see [29].
Next we provide a summary of the working-set ter-
minology. For brevity, we use the term unit of refer-
ence, or simply unit, as a substitute for the referenced
object (e.g., prefixes); and reference set to represent
the set of all referenced units. Then, considering a
reference set N, we define a reference string as the
sequence ρ = r1r2 . . . ri . . . where each unit ri ∈ N .
If t is a measure of time in units, then we can state:
Definition 1. Given a reference string, the working-
set W (t, T ) is the set of distinct units that have been
referenced among the T most recent references, or in
the interval [t− T + 1, t].
A graphical depiction can be found in Figure 2. In
accordance with [10] we refer to T as the window size
and denote the number of distinct pages in W (t, T ),
the working-set size, as w(t, T ). The average working-
set size, s(T), measures the growth of the working-set
with respect to the size of the window T, extending
in the past, but independent of absolute time t. It is
defined as:
s (T ) = lim
k→∞
1
k
k∑
t=1
w(t, T ) (1)
It can be proved that the the miss rate, m(T),
which measures the number of units of reference per
unit time returning to the working-set, is the deriva-
tive of the previous function and that the sign in-
verted slope of the miss rate function, the second
slope of s(T ), represents the average interreference
distance density function, f(T ). For a broader scope
discussion of these properties and complete proofs,
the interested reader is referred to [10].
It is important to note that s(T ) and m(T ), if com-
putable, provide estimates on the minimum average
size of a cache able to hold the working-set, i.e., the
prefixes in the active locality, and its corresponding
miss rate with respect to the number of references
processed. Our goal in this paper is to determine if
m(s) exists for real network traffic and if it can be
modeled as simple function without a considerable
loss of precision.
3.2 Network Traffic Locality
As explained by Denning in [10], a working-set analy-
sis of reference strings may be performed only if based
on three constraints that provide for a more rigorous
definition for locality of reference:
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Figure 3: Empirical working-set curves with starting times spaced by 30 min and evenly distributed over a
day. Closeness of color nuance reflects closeness of start time. Notice their tendency to cluster.
1. Reference strings are unending
2. The stochastic mechanism underlying the gener-
ation of a reference string is stationary, i.e. in-
dependent of absolute time origin.
3. For t > 0, rt and rt+x become uncorrelated as
x→∞
The first, though obviously not fulfillable, intro-
duces an insignificant error because the reference
strings generated by practical programs or traces are
long from a statistical standpoint. The third requires
that references become uncorrelated as the distance
goes to infinity. This can usually be asserted as be-
ing true in practice. The most restrictive of the three
is the second, which limits the analysis to a locality
where all three constraints, including stationarity are
satisfied.
In practice however, network traffic reference
strings may consists of sequences of localities when
either each is characterized by a distinct stationary
processes or, alternatively, when some present non-
stationarities. In such scenarios the results, like the
average working-set size, are only valid within a lo-
cality, and not to be extrapolated for the whole trace.
To test for this possibility and to identify the refer-
ence string segments having different generating pro-
cesses in network traffic traces, we devise the simple
experimental methodology that follows.
To enable our analysis, since computing the w(t, T )
for all acceptable integer combination of t and T is
intractable, we define the working-set curve to be
w(t, T ) as a function of T , when the past time ref-
erence of the working-set is held fixed, i.e., t − T =
cst. For instance, considering Figure 2, w(t, T ) and
w(t + 1, T + 1) are consecutive points on a working-
set curve with start time t − T . Then, for a given
trace, we compute multiple empirical destination pre-
fix working-set curves with start times spanning one
day and spaced by a fixed interval. Intuitively, one
would expect that the clustering patterns of the
curves should distinguish between the multitude of
generating process. That is, curves with close start
times should have a similar growth shape (cluster),
because they follow a similar sequence of localities,
whereas those separated by larger time lags should
behave differently. More formally stated:
Proposition 1. The clustering of the working-set
curves, under which ∀T,w(t, T ) is normally dis-
tributed, is equivalent to the stationarity of the pro-
cess generating the reference string.
We provide a proof for the the proposition in the
Appendix. In addition, we empirically confirm the
result by using it to determine the stationary pro-
cesses embedded in four real network traffic traces.
Details regarding the traffic captures can be found in
Section 4.1.
For each network trace we computed working-set
curves spaced by half an hour. Figure 3 presents
the working-set curves of the four datasets in log-
log plots. It can be noticed that all traces exhibit a
strong clustering and sublinear growth, due to tem-
poral locality. Although, the number of samples
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does not allow for an accurate enough testing, we
could also confirm that ∀T,w(t, T ) is close to nor-
mally distributed by manual inspection and graphi-
cally. Therefore, in light of the previous proposition,
we find that each trace can be considered as gener-
ated by a single stationary process.
To validate the result, we also independently tested
the stationarity of the process generating the refer-
ence string by applying the augmented Dickey-Fuller
unit root test [5] to the interreference distance time
series. Due to the large size of the dataset we first
aggregated the time series by computing for each win-
dow of 10k data points the mean and subsequently
applied the test to the resulting mean series. For all
traces, the null hypothesis that the series has a unit
root, with the alternative that the series is stationary,
was rejected (p < 0.01).
Undoubtedly, the most surprising result of the
analysis is the stationarity of the processes generating
the four traces. It follows that the average working-
set and the other metrics derived from it character-
ize a trace in its entirety. This might seem to be
somewhat counter-intuitive if one considers the non-
stationarities of network traffic when analyzed in the
time domain. However, we believe stationarity to be
the result of flow multiplexing, whereby the effect of
short term correlations is canceled out by the influ-
ence of destination popularity, as shown in the case
of Web traffic in [18].
Similarly, Kim et al. observed in [19] that the
working-set size for prefixes tends to be highly stable
with time for traffic pertaining to a large ISP. We
would like to stress that we do not assume all traffic
in the Internet is generated by stationary processes,
i.e., possesses an approximate time translation invari-
ance of the working-set curves like the one observed
in Figure 3. And in fact, we require that the model
we develop further be applied only to traces that have
this property.
3.3 Analytical Cache Model
Because the exact form of the average working-set
size, as obtained using (1), is rather cumbersome to
work with, a shorter but approximate representation
would be desirable. With hindsight, one can recog-
nize that the empirical working-set curves from Fig-
ure 3 are piecewise linear when depicted in log-log
scale. This observation enables us to approximate
the average working-set size, s(u), for each trace with
respect to the number of packets u, by means of a
piecewise linear fit of the log-log scale plot. We there-
fore obtain estimates of both the slope, α, and the
y-intercept, β, for all segments. In our results, we
limited the number of segments to just four, however
if better fits are desirable, more segments may be
used. Through conversion to linear scale the average
working-set equation becomes piecewise power law of
the type:
s(u) = eβ(u)uα(u) (2)
where, u represents the number of referenced desti-
nation prefixes, or the window size, s(u) is the fitted
working-set size function and α(u), 0 < α(u) ≤ 1,
and β(u) ≥ 0 are piecewise constant, decreasing and
respectively increasing functions obtained through
fitting. Defined as such, the pair (α(u), β(u)) pro-
vides a compressed characterization of the temporal
locality present within a trace with respect to time,
i.e., number of packets.
We can estimate the miss rate for a trace by com-
puting the derivative of s(u) like:
m(u) = eβ(u) α(u)uα(u)−1 (3)
Taking the inverse of (2) and inserting it in (3) we
obtain an analytical relation that links the cache size
and the estimated miss rate:
m(s) = e β
∗(s)/α∗(s) α∗(s) s1−1/α
∗(s) (4)
where, s represents the cache size in number of entries
and α∗(s) and β∗(s) are piecewise constant functions
with knees dependent on s. This equation accurately
predicts cache performance over longer spans of time,
if s(u) is relatively stable in the considered time frame
(more on this in Section 5).
Regarding the type of cache modeled, it is use-
ful to note that the working-set, W (t, u), gener-
ally models a cache that always contains the w(t, u)
most recently referenced units. Then, given that
∀u,w(t, u) ∼ N(σ, µ2), W (t, u) actually models a
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cache of size normally distributed and dependent on
u. In particular, when σ is small, or goes to zero,
it behaves like the size were fixed. Finally, because
the implicit eviction policy requires that entries not
referenced in a window of length u are discarded, for
low σ, like in our traces, the working-set simulates a
cache of fixed size with a LRU eviction policy.
To summarize, because we find that ∀u, the
working-set size is normally distributed and that traf-
fic may be seen as generated by a stationary process,
(4) actually models a cache with LRU eviction and
size dependent on u. We validate the model and the
efficiency of LRU in Section 4.3.
3.4 Cache Model for Cache Pollution
Attacks
The model presented in the previous section can be
extended to account for situations when intra-domain
users perform EID space scanning attacks that signif-
icantly alter the working-set curves and therefore the
shared map-cache’s performance. In this work we fo-
cus on assessing the damage users can inflict through
data-plane attacks and do not consider control-plane
attacks like those described in [27].
We define a scanning attack as the situation when
one or multiple users, acting jointly, send packets over
a large period of time (e.g., hours), to destinations
having a high probability of not being found in the
cache. The goal would be to either generate cache
misses, resulting in control plane overload or, if the
cache is not large enough, to generate cache evictions,
which would affect ongoing flows. For instance, hav-
ing a list of EID prefixes, an attack would consist
in sending packets with destinations enumerating all
prefixes in the set in a random order, at a certain
packet rate. Once all destinations are exhausted the
enumeration would start over.
In what follows we formally define the parameters
of the attack. Let, Ω be the EID-prefix set used in
the attack and Ψ the network’s visited EID-prefix
set. We define the relative attack intensity ρ as the
ratio between the attack packet rate and the legiti-
mate traffic packet rate, additionally, let the attack
overlap δ be the ratio between the number of prefixes
common to Ω and Ψ and the cardinality of Ψ thus,
δ = |Ω ∩Ψ|/|Ψ|.
If a network trace with average working-set s(u)
is augmented by a scanning attack of relative at-
tack intensity ρ and overlap δ, the resulting average
working-set becomes:
sa(u+ ρu) =
s(u) + ρu−
δs(uk)
uk
u, u < uk
s(u) + |Ω| − δs(u)
(5)
where uk = |Ω|/ρ and it represents the number of le-
gitimate packets after which the attack exhausts all
|Ω| destinations and the scan restarts. The aggre-
gate working-set has three components. The first is
due to legitimate traffic, s(u), and the second, due
to the attack packets, ρu. However, because the two
may overlap, a third component subtracts the num-
ber of shared prefixes. For simplicity, we approxi-
mate the probability of having destinations repeat to
be uniform. Thereby, the growth of the overlap is
linear with u up to uk, where it reaches a maximum
of δs(uk) and afterwards linear with s(u).
After a change of variable and denoting τ = 1/(1+
ρ), or the ratio of legitimate traffic in the trace, uk =
|Ω|
1− τ and the equation becomes:
sa(u) =
s(τu) +
(
1− τ − τδs(uk)
uk
)
u, u < uk
(1− δ)s(τu) + |Ω|
(6)
Then, the miss as a function of the number of pro-
cessed packets is:
ma(u) =
τ m(τu) +
(
1− τ − τδs(uk)
uk
)
, u < uk
τ(1− δ)m(τu)
(7)
However, in this case the miss rate cannot be rep-
resented analytically as a function of the cache size
since s−1a (u) is not expressible in terms of standard
mathematical functions. It can though be computed
numerically as a function u, when s(u) is known.
Then, given that both sa(u) and ma(u) are known,
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they suffice to understand the cache’s miss rate as
a function of the cache size. The resulting model
predicts overall cache misses, not only those due to
legitimate traffic. Therefore, it provides an estimate
of the control plane overload, not a data plane perfor-
mance estimate for legitimate traffic. We empirically
validate the result in Section 4.3.
4 Model Validation
In this section, we present the evaluation methodol-
ogy and the results that validate our models. We
start by describing our datasets and then pass on to
present the ITR emulator employed in the empiri-
cal evaluation of the cache. Last, we compare the
empirical results to those predicted by the analytical
models.
4.1 Datasets
Four one-day packet traces were used for the purpose
of our experiments. Three of them have been cap-
tured at the 2Gbps link connecting several of our Uni-
versity’s campus networks to the Catalan Research
Network (CESCA) and consist only of egress traffic.
UPC campus has more than 36k users. The first trace
dates back to May 26th, 2009 while the other two are
from October 19th, 2011 and November 21st, 2012.
The fourth trace was captured on January 24th, 2013
at CESCA’s 10Gbps link connecting it to the Spanish
academic network (RedIris) and consists of egress-
ing academic traffic. In 2011, CESCA was provid-
ing transit services for 89 institutions, including the
greater part of public Catalan schools, hospitals and
universities.
Table 1 summarizes some of the important prop-
erties of our datasets. First of all, it can be seen
that cesca 2013, being an aggregate trace, is about
3.6 times larger than the most recent UPC trace in
terms of number of packets and packet rate. How-
ever, it only contains 1.3 times more prefixes. This
shows that although the number of users and pack-
ets exchanged is considerably higher, the diversity of
the destinations is only slightly incremented. Out of
the UPC traces, upc 2009 exhibits a surprisingly high
number of packets but this is explained by the very
large packet rates seen during the active hours of the
day. In fact, the average packet rate during the peak
hours was 4.7 times higher that for the rest of the day.
Again, this difference did not reflect in the number
of unique prefixes observed in a one second window
as, on average, we observed just 1.3 times more pre-
fixes in the peak hours than during the remainder of
the day. These two observations suggest that higher
packet rates, either resulting from larger user sets or
from higher throughput flows, do not increase desti-
nation diversity (as illustrated in Figure 3) but in-
stead reinforce temporal locality. In addition, these
properties also explain why the working-set curves
for upc 2009 present a time-of-day behavior (see Fig-
ure 3a).
4.2 Map-Cache Emulator
To evaluate the two models and the effectiveness of
the working-set as a tool for cache performance pre-
diction, we implemented a packet trace based emula-
tor that mimics basic ITR functionality.
Both for computing the working-sets in Section 3.2
and for the cache performance evaluation, destina-
tion IP addresses had to be mapped to their cor-
responding prefixes. We considered EID-prefixes to
be of BGP-prefix granularity. For each traffic trace,
we linked IP addresses to prefixes using BGP rout-
ing tables (BGPRT ) downloaded from the RouteViews
archive [30] that matched the trace’s capture date.
In particular, we used collector route-views4 situated
at University of Oregon. The only preprocessing we
performed was to filter out more specific prefixes.
Generally, they are used for traffic engineering pur-
poses but LISP provides mechanisms for a more effi-
cient management of these operational needs that do
not require EID-prefix de-aggregation. We refer to
the resulting list as BGPφ. Table 2 shows the size of
the routing tables used for each trace and provides
the proportion of prefixes seen within each trace out
of the total registered in the filtered routing table,
Ψ/BGPφ. It may be seen that, as the ratio is always
higher that 0.5, more than half of the possible desti-
nation prefixes are visited in one day for all traces.
For each packet processed, the emulator maps the
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Table 1: Datasets Statistics
upc 2009 upc 2011 upc 2012 cesca 2013
Date 2009-05-26 2011-10-19 2012-11-21 2013-01-24
Packets 6.5B 4.05B 5.57B 20B
Av. pkt/s 75312 46936 64484 232063
Ψ 92801 94964 109451 143775
Av. pref/s 2323 1952 2123 2560
Table 2: Routing Tables Statistics
upc 2009 upc 2011 upc 2012 cesca 2013
BGPRT 288167 400655 450796 455647
BPGφ 142154 170638 213070 216272
Ψ/BGPφ 0.65 0.55 0.51 0.66
destination IP address to a prefix in BGPφ. If this
prefix is already stored in the ITR’s cache, its cache
entry is updated and the emulator continues with the
next packet. Should the prefix not yet be stored in
the cache, two possibilities arise. First, if the cache
is not full, the destination prefix is stored in and the
processing proceeds to the next packet. Second, if
the cache is full, an entry is evicted, the new prefix
is stored in and then the emulator moves to the next
packet. The entry to be evicted is chosen according
to the LRU eviction policy. We use LRU because, as
mentioned in Section 3.3, its performance should be
close to optimal due to the stationarity of the trace
generating process. Accordingly, the performance of
the cache should be appropriately described by (4).
Scanning attacks are emulated by uniform inser-
tion of attack packets in-between those pertaining to
the processed traffic trace, according to the relative
attack intensity ρ. The number of attack addresses
generated depends on δ, the overlap between Ω and
Ψ, and the number of destinations in BGPφ. Note
that Ω ⊆ BGPφ and Ψ ⊆ BGPφ. Therefore, suppos-
ing the attack maximizes number of addresses used,
to increase effectiveness, |Ω| = |BGPφ − Ψ| + δ|Ψ|.
In particular, when no overlap exists, we generate
|Ω| = |BGPφ −Ψ| new destination addresses while for
a full overlap, the attack consists of |Ω| = |BGPφ| ad-
dresses. If δ 6= 0, the addresses used in the attack
and part of Ψ are uniformly distributed among those
part of BGPφ −Ψ.
4.3 Comparison of Analytical and
Empirical Results
To validate the models we use the emulator to esti-
mate empirical cache miss rate for several cache sizes.
Figure 4 presents a comparison of the empirical and
predicted results for normal traffic, where cache size
is normalized with corresponding BGPφ routing table
size (see Table 2). It may be seen that, typically,
the absolute error is negligible despite the disconti-
nuities of the model, which are due to the piecewise
fitting. Further, the equation appropriately predicts
that performance stays acceptable, even for small
cache sizes, fact also observed by [15, 20, 17]. The
result is even more remarkable as we never remove
stale entries in our emulator, i.e., we consider TTL
to be infinite.
The figures present the cache miss rate only up to
a fraction of BGPφ, the one associated to |Ψ|, because
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Figure 4: Comparison between empirical and modeled miss rates, as estimated by (4), for normal cache
operation.
the growth of s(u) cannot be extrapolated after this
point. Since the working-set grows slower for larger
u, as α(u) is a strictly decreasing function, poten-
tially much longer traces would be needed to enable
inference about larger cache sizes. In fact, given that
only part of the whole prefix space may be visited by
the clients of a stub network, even for longer traces
the analysis may be limited to a cache size lower than
|BGPφ|.
There are two limitations to the precision of our
analysis for large u values. First, as cache size in-
creases and approaches |Ψ|, the accuracy of the pre-
diction diminishes. This is explained by the 24-hour
length of the traces, whereby there are few working-
set curves that span close to a whole day and thus
grow to reach the maximum number of destination
prefixes. Recall that the start times for the working-
set curves span the whole trace and are spaced by
30 minutes, so the last curves consist of few packets.
As a consequence, s(u) is estimated using a reduced
number of points, i.e., with a lower precision, at the
higher end. To counter this effect, we compute aver-
age working-sets of slightly diminished length. The
second limitation is the bias of our emulation results
for large cache sizes. Caches whose sizes are close
to |Ψ| fill only once the traces are processed almost
in their entirety. Due to this cold-start effect, cache
are exposed to a low number of hits up to the end
of the traces. As these hits do not manage to out-
weigh the misses generated during the cache fill up,
the miss rate of the emulator for large cache sizes
is slightly overestimated. Nevertheless, despite these
limitations, it may be seen that the results still yield
a good fit for large u.
We also validate our cache model that accounts for
scanning attacks considering as scenarios a complete
attack overlap or one that is zero. Thereby, the at-
tackers may use as attack prefix set either the whole
EID-prefix space or just the part not visited by the
attacked network’s clients. In the latter case, if the
cache is not large enough to hold all prefixes, all at-
tack packets would generate a cache miss. However,
note that building such a prefix set would require full
knowledge about the network’s traffic. In the former
case, some packet destinations may generate cache
hits but |Ω| may potentially be much larger and this
could prove beneficial to the attacker. In light of
these properties we consider the two attacks as worst
case scenarios, from the attacked network’s perspec-
tive, for the situations when attackers respectively
have or do not have knowledge about the attacked
network’s traffic.
Figure 5 compares the analytical and empirical re-
sults for the cache miss rate, when δ ∈ {0, 1} and
ρ ∈ {0.01, 0.1, 0.5}. We present the results just for
upc 2012 since those for the other three traces are
similar. It may be observed that for both no overlap
and complete overlap the results exhibit little abso-
lute error. In particular, for δ = 0 when cache size is
larger and miss rates are less than 10−4 the errors are
more significant. As in the case of the cache model,
this is explained by the trace length and the reduced
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Figure 5: Comparison between empirical and mod-
eled miss rates, as estimated by (6) and (7), un-
der scanning attacks with attack intensity ρ ∈
{0.01, 0.1, 0.5} for upc 2012.
number of points used in estimating the higher end
of s(u). The effect is not noticeable for δ = 1 because
sa(u) reaches its maximum (saturates) for low values
of u due to the larger attack set. Consequently, the
fit is very good along the whole spectrum of cache
sizes. Once the cache size reaches |BGPφ| the miss
rate becomes 0 since there are no more destination
prefixes outside those already present in the cache to
generate a miss.
5 Discussion
In this section we discuss the results and predictions
of our models regarding map-cache performance for
both normal and malicious traffic. We also discuss
possible avenues to diminishing the effect of cache
attacks.
The results we obtained are relevant only when
reasoned about jointly with the traffic traces used
in the analysis. However, the diversity of our data
sets and previous results from Kim [19], Iannone [15]
and Kim [20] suggest that the properties uncovered
are not the expression of isolated user and network
behavior.
5.1 Cache Model Results and Predic-
tions
Under the condition of a stationary generating pro-
cess or, equivalently, the approximate time trans-
lation invariance of the working-set curves, our
methodology enables the estimation of the time in-
variant piecewise functions α(u) and β(u) that char-
acterize the locality of a network traffic trace from
the average working-set size s(u). This further facili-
tates the following two findings. First, due to the low
variance of s(u) and experimentally proven good per-
formance, we can now recommend the use of the LRU
eviction policy for LISP caches. Second, in such sit-
uation, (4) may be used to dimension the cache sizes
in operational environments, according to the desired
miss rate. The prediction of its mathematical expres-
sion, considering that α∗(c)→ 0 when c increases, is
that miss rate decreases at an accelerated pace with
cache size and finally settles to a power-law decrease.
This may also be observed in Figure 4 where at each
discontinuity point the function switches to a faster
decreasing curve. Of course, the speed of the de-
crease depends on the degree of locality present in
the trace. Overall the equation indicates that cache
sizes need not be very large for obtaining good per-
formance. For instance, having a cache of size 10% of
BGPφ, about 14k − 21k entries for UPC traces and
21k for the CESCA one, would result in a miss rate of
approximately 0.09%− 0.2% and respectively 0.03%.
In this context, an important point would be to
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determine the extent of time over which the results
and predictions hold. Figure 6 provides a coarse an-
swer for the particular case of the traffic used in our
analysis. First, considering the UPC traces, it may
be observed that over a span of tree and a half years,
the average working-set is rather stable when size is
less than about 50k prefixes. In fact, the s(u) curves
of upc 2011 and upc 2012 are very similar, indepen-
dent of u value, while the one for upc 2009 exhibits a
lower slope for u > 100M packets. This might appear
to be in agreement with the relative, year-over-year,
increase of BGPφ. But the relative differences be-
tween the values of s(u) and the increase of BGPφ
are not directly related since the growth from 2009
to 2011 was smaller than the one from 2011 to 2012.
This is to be expected because many of the new pre-
fixes, resulting from the sustained growth of the In-
ternet’s edge [7], may never become destinations for
users of other edge networks. So, a direct relation be-
tween the increment of the routing table size and that
of s(u) should not necessarily be expected. Instead,
given the good overlap for lower values of u, prefix
popularity distribution should be more relevant to
the shape of the working-set than the absolute num-
ber of destination. Second, the comparison between
cesca 2013 and the UPC traces reveals that larger
user sets, and implicitly higher traffic rates, result
in a slightly slower growing s(u). In fact, the only
noticeable difference is at short time scales, where
the larger trace has a smaller slope. This could be
explained by a change in the destination popularity
distribution, as cesca2013 aggregates more types of
user profiles, but also by a shift in the short-term
temporal correlation. However, considering the large
number of users, their synchronization at short time
scales seems rather unlikely.
Then, although apparently stable over relatively
long time spans, the shape of s(u) seems to be influ-
enced by non trivial interactions between the number
of clients the prefix popularity distribution and pos-
sibly other unexplored factors. We are not ready to
model these interactions here. Thus, our cautious
inference is that the average working-set should be
stable over time, if the number of clients and the
popularity distribution are relatively stable.
Despite not being indicated by our measurements,
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Figure 6: Evolution of s(u) over the years. The shape
appears to be influenced by the number of users and
the destination popularity distribution.
it may be finally proven that the variability with
time of s(u) is highly dependent on properties of
the network being measured, themselves time depen-
dent. Should this be the case, the methodology we
develop in this paper is still valuable for the analysis
of cache performance if not for long term provisioning
of caches.
5.2 Cache Poisoning and Manage-
ment Strategies
We compared the effect of scanning attacks with zero
or complete overlap to identify the one most damag-
ing and to quantify their effect on cache performance.
Associated results were presented in Figure 5.
If cache sizes are small, both attacks results in very
high cache miss rate, including for ρ = 0.01, when the
attack has a rate of only 644 packets per second. In
this range, miss rate is almost independent of attack
overlap, only slightly higher for δ = 0 due to the
informed selection of attack address space. However,
for δ = 0 the cache performance is much improved af-
ter a certain threshold is passed whereas for δ = 1 it
barely changes up to when cache size becomes BGPφ
and miss rate drops to 0. In other words, the non
overlapping attack may be absorbed with larger cache
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sizes while the overlapping one no. Perhaps counter-
intuitively, overlapping attacks are more damaging
against a map-cache. They are easier to generate,
as they do not require prior knowledge about the at-
tacked network. But, they are also harder to defend
against since, after a certain point and for a wide
ranges of values, increasing the cache sizes does not
yield much improved performance if less than BGPφ.
Arguably, the most worrisome result we observe is
the rather high miss rate which barely drops under
0.01, even for ρ = 0.01 and only when the normal-
ized cache size is higher than 0.2. As a comparison,
under normal operation this miss rate would be ob-
tained with a normalized cache size of about 0.02, an
order of magnitude less. Therefore, considering the
high packet throughput of border routers, some more
complex cache management strategies should be set
in place to avoid hundreds to thousands of packet
drops per second.
One possible first step to circumventing the ef-
fect of cache polluting attacks would be to detect
them prior to taking action. This may be achieved
with s(u), if a ground truth estimation of its shape
exists. So, if s(u) is known beforehand, an esti-
mate of the average miss rate for the cache size used
can be computed. Then, if the instantaneous miss
rate surpasses this estimate by more than configured
threshold, a cache protecting action could be taken.
For instance, the top, or most recently used, part
of the cache could be “protected” against eviction.
Other measures could include the implementation of
a cache hierarchy or the limiting of user request rate
for new destinations. In the former case, evicted en-
tries should be stored in a larger but higher access
time cache while in the latter some of the network el-
ements should monitor per user traffic and filter out
attack attempts. Since it is not within the scope of
this paper we do not explore other aspects related to
the implementation of such tools.
6 Related Work
Feldmeier [12] and Jain [16] were among the first to
evaluate the possibility of performing destination ad-
dress caching by exploiting the locality of traffic in
network environments. Feldmeier analyzed traffic on
a gateway router and showed that caching of both
flat and prefix addresses can significantly reduce rout-
ing table lookup times. Jain however performed his
analysis in an Ethernet environment. He was forced
to concede that despite the locality observed in the
traffic, small cache performance was struggling due
to traffic generated by protocols with deterministic
behavior. Both works were fundamental to the field
however their results were empirical and date back to
the beginning of the 1990s, years when the Internet
was still in its infancy.
Recently, Kim et al. [19] showed the feasibility of
route caching after performing a measurement study
within the operational confinement of an ISP’s net-
work. They show by means of an experimental evalu-
ation that Least Recently Used (LRU) cache eviction
policy performs close to optimal and that working-set
size is generally stable with time. We also observe the
stability of the working-set for our data sets but we
further leverage it to build a LRU model instead of
just empirically evaluating its performance.
Several works have previously looked at cache per-
formance in location/identity split scenarios consid-
ering LISP as a reference implementation. Iannone et
al. [15] performed an initial trace driven study of the
LISP map-cache performance. Instead of limiting the
cache size by using an eviction policy, their cache im-
plementation evicted stale entries after a configurable
timeout value. Further, Kim et al. [20] have both ex-
tended and confirmed the previous results with the
help of a larger, ISP trace and by considering LISP
security aspects in their evaluation. Ignoring control
plane security concerns, which we did not consider,
and despite differences regarding the cache eviction
policy, the results of these last two works seem to be
in agreement with ours. Zhang et al. [32] performed
a trace based mappings cache performance analysis
assuming a LRU eviction policy. They used two 24-
hour traffic traces captured at two egressing links of
the China Education and Research Network back-
bone network. They concluded that a small cache
can offer good results. Finally, Jakab et al. [17] ana-
lyzed the performance of several LISP mapping sys-
tems and, without focusing on a cache analysis, also
observed very low miss rates for a cache model similar
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to that used in [15].
Our work confirms previous LISP cache analysis
results however, it also tries to provide a better un-
derstanding of the reasons behind the relatively good
performance of map-caches. In this sense it intro-
duces an analytical model that could be used to theo-
retically evaluate or dimension for operational needs
the caching performance. Moreover, to the best of
our knowledge, it is also the first work to perform
an analysis and propose an analytical model for the
map-cache performance when under scanning data-
plane attacks.
7 Conclusions
The implementation of a location/identity split at
network level has been recently recommended as a
viable solution to the Internet’s routing scalability
problems. But, unless deployed with care, the cure
may prove worse than the disease. Hence, a good
understanding of the newly introduced components,
like the map-cache, is paramount.
In this paper, we propose a methodology to eval-
uate map-cache performance. Our model is built by
exploring the link between cache performance and
parameters that approximate the intrinsic locality of
packet level user traffic. To this end, we advance
the use of the working-set model as a tool to capture
said properties but also as a performance predictor.
Accordingly, we define a framework wherein to per-
form the analysis and find that the clustering of the
working-set curves is the only condition needed to
ensure the accuracy of the model. We empirically
validate our result by emulation, using traffic traces
collected at the edges of a campus and an academic
network.
Besides the possibility of using the model for cache
dimensioning or detecting attacks in operational en-
vironments, we believe the equation may also be
used as part of more complex models that evalu-
ate the scalability of loc/id architectures. To stress
these points, we show the versatility of our method-
ology by characterizing map-cache performance for
our datasets and by building an extension that ac-
counts for cache pollution attacks. Our observations
indicate that increasing cache size quickly diminishes
miss rates in normal conditions but has little to no ef-
fect under simple cache pollution attacks. In the lat-
ter case, we advise that more complex management
strategies be devised and set in place. In the future,
we plan to fully investigate the sources of locality in
prefix level network traffic to better understand their
impact on cache performance.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. If ∀T the working-set size w(t, T ) is normally
distributed, and therefore independent of t, it fol-
lows that the process generating w(t, T ) is station-
ary. This in turn implies the stationarity of the pro-
cess generating the reference string and, as a result,
necessity is proven. It remains to be proved that if
the working-set curves are generated by the same sta-
tionary process then they will tend to cluster. In [10]
it is shown that for a certain window size T the dis-
tribution of w(t, T ) converges to a normal distribu-
tion if the locality conditions hold. This proves suffi-
ciency.
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